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This thesis analyzes two acquisition reform initiatives that made Theater
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Radar Product Office's Best of Breed
Transmit/Receive Module study a success and examines the risk involved in the
pursuit of this study. The initiatives are Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV)
and commercial items in the form of dual-use technology. Analysis of the radar
subsystem ofTHAAD reveals a major cost driver to be the transmit/receive (T/R)
module in the antenna equipment. The Best of Breed study examined techniques
in the design, engineering, and manufacturing of these modules and its
components in order to aggressively reduce the unit cost. Using tenets of CAIV,
THAAD Radar Product Office was able to define a study such that the contractor
would recommend a low risk solution to achieve cost reductions of almost 50% for
the module. Additionally, the Product Office was able to accomplish this without
sacrificing performance or schedule. The commercial application of the T/R
module was an important factor in motivating the contractor to seek aggressive
cost reductions. Lessons from this case may be applicable to other programs
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The purpose of this research is to analyze acquisition reform initiatives that
made Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Radar Product Office's Best
of Breed Transmit/Receive Module study a success and to examine the risk
involved in the pursuit of this study. Analysis of the radar subsystem of THAAD
reveals a major cost driver to be the transmit/receive (T/R) module in the antenna
equipment. The unit cost of the module is not relatively expensive. What makes it
a cost driver is the number required for each antenna - 25,344. The Best of Breed
study was contracted during the system's extended risk reduction phase of
development in anticipation of Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD). The purpose of the study was to examine industry techniques in the
design, engineering, and manufacturing of these modules and its components in
order to aggressively reduce the unit cost. The acquisition reform environment of
the past five years played a large part in the success this study. Reform ideas such
as Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) and the use of commercial items were
key in the development and execution of the study.
This thesis will examine the Best of Breed study with those reform ideas in
mind. Future programs may benefit from the lessons learned by THAAD Radar
Product Office's experience with this cost saving idea.
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B. BACKGROUND
The THAAD system is a theater anti-ballistic missile weapon. It is
designed to protect deployed U.S. and allied forces from enemy ballistic missile
attacks. The THAAD system is comprised of four subsystems: the missile, the
launcher, Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
and Intelligence (BMC4I), and the radar. All four components are critical to the
success of the weapon system. Since 1995, as part of the Program Definition and
Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase of development, the system has undergone eight
flight tests. The last five of those flight tests were designed to intercept a target
missile. The system has failed to succeed in any of the five attempts. Test data
revealed that the missile is the source of failure for all five of these attempts.
Failure on these tests has caused the program to remain in the PDRR phase of
development. THAAD Radar Product Office has used this time to reduce risk in
areas of concern while waiting to transition to EMD.
Within the last year, THAAD Radar Product Office has invested in, and
switched to, an advanced technology in T/R modules that will allow it to meet the
performance requirements for EMD. In doing so, they were able to maintain the
average unit price of the module at the same level.
Congressional and public disappointment in the poor results of the THAAD
system have caused drastic cutbacks in its funding. Due to these funding
constraints, efforts throughout the program are examining ways to reduce cost.
Efforts within the Radar Product Office have focused on reducing the price of its
major cost driver, the T/R module.
Analysis of this effort will examine the acquisition reform initiatives that
were critical to the viability of this cost saving initiative.
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to examine the Best of Breed module study
conducted by the THAAD Radar Product Office and the risk that pursuit of this
study brings to the program. The goal of this study was to drastically reduce the
cost of the transmit/receive module on the system's radar antenna. A reduction in
cost will result in dramatic life cycle cost savings for the system. Lessons learned
from this undertaking will be described. These lessons may benefit other
programs seeking to reduce cost in high technology areas.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What acquisition reform initiatives were most instrumental in the cost
saving initiative being undertaken by the THAAD Radar Product Office in their
Best of Breed T/R Module study?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
• How was Cost As an Independent Variable applied to the THAAD
Radar development?
• How did dual-use technology enhance the Best of Breed study?
• What is the overall risk of the Best of Breed study to program cost,
schedule, and performance?
• What are the benefits of the THAAD Best of Breed study?
E. SCOPE
Analysis of the Best of Breed study has focused on the risk associated with
the study and not on the execution of the ideas. Much of the information contained
in the study is considered competition sensitive by the radar subcontractor,
Raytheon. Cost figures given in the thesis are approximate figures and should not
be construed as exact figures.
Completed in December 1998, the study shows the feasibility of achieving
the cost objective for the module. As yet, funding for the implementation of the
ideas contained in the study is lacking.
F. METHODOLOGY
This thesis is a case study of the Best of Breed module study conducted by
THAAD Radar Product Office and the associated program risk. A review of
books, magazines, electronic databases, and other library information sources was
conducted in order to obtain background information on the THAAD system and
acquisition reform. Documents were found through research conducted at the
Naval Postgraduate School Library and through the internet. Specific information
regarding the THAAD radar and the Best of Breed study was obtained from the
THAAD Radar Product Office and through interviews with members of that office
and the radar subcontractor, Raytheon.
The concepts of Cost As an Independent Variable and commercial items in
the form of dual-use technology are developed and then applied to the Best of
Breed study. Additionally, the basics of risk assessment are addressed and then a
risk assessment is conducted on the Best of Breed study.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter I is the introduction of the thesis. Included are the research
questions, scope, and methodology of the thesis.
Chapter II provides background information on the THAAD system and its
components. A detailed discussion of the radar and recent challenges to its
development conclude the chapter.
Chapter III examines the acquisition reform initiatives of Cost As an
Independent Variable and commercial products. The dual-use concept within the
commercial products initiative is emphasized.
Chapter IV analyzes the Best of Breed module study within the framework
of the acquisition reform initiatives CAIV and commercial products and examines
program risk associated with the Best of Breed study.
Chapter V includes the recommendations and conclusions of the thesis. It
answers the research questions and addresses areas for additional research.
II. THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE (THAAD)
PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the THAAD system. A discussion of
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and its missions is necessary
in order to understand how THAAD fits into the architecture of tactical missile
defense. System component descriptions are provided in order to understand the
importance of each subsystem to the overall system effectiveness. Finally, a
detailed discussion of the radar and the recent efforts in development are provided
to understand the focus of a current cost-saving initiative.
B. THAAD PROGRAM OVERVIEW
The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction has
given rise to concerns by the United States on ballistic missile protection of both
the United States and our deployed forces. To address these concerns, the
Department of Defense (DOD) created the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization (SDIO) which later became the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO). The priorities of BMDO are Theater Missile Defense
(TMD), National Missile Defense (NMD), and Advanced Technology.
Consequently, BMDO has organized itself around these missions. [Ref. l:p. 1]
The primary mission of NMD is to defend the U.S. against a ballistic
missile threat. The role of advanced technology programs is the development of
technologies for future missile defense systems, as well as development of
technology that existing missile defense programs may need.
Theater Missile Defense programs are designed to protect U.S. and allied
forces when operationally deployed. Due to the growing variety of missiles and
the complexity of operational scenarios, no single system can respond to the
operational need. In response to this complexity, a Family of Systems (FOS)
concept is being developed. This concept will use land and sea-based systems
capable of operating jointly in order to defeat the threat. [Ref. l:pp. 1-4] One of
these systems is THAAD system. As an upper-tier system of a two-tiered
architecture, THAAD 's objective is to shoot down missiles at long range and high
altitudes. Engagement of targets at great distances will enable multiple engage-
ments of the target, as well as safeguarding friendly forces from falling debris
following the successful interception of a hostile missile. The latter is critical
should the missile contain a weapon of mass destruction. [Ref. 2:p. 1]
Program History
Interest in a theater missile defense system began in 1987 with the initiation
of concept studies by the High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor Project
Office. These studies explored the feasibility of a hit-to-kill missile employing
key technologies such as infrared seekers, fast response control systems, and
cooled seeker windows. [Ref. 3:p. 28] Following these studies, concept definition
contracts were awarded to three teams for a THAAD missile. After U.S. and allied
forces experiences with Scud missiles during Operation Desert Storm and
legislation contained in the 1991 Missile Defense Act, the concept definition
contracts were modified to incorporate designs for a complete THAAD system
including a launcher and battle management, command, control, communications,
and computers (BMC4I). The system's sensor, a radar, was to be provided as
Government furnished equipment (GFE). In early 1992, the Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB) approved the acquisition strategy for THAAD during a Milestone I
review. [Ref. 4:pp. 14-15] Included in this strategy was the decision to develop an
operational prototype during the Demonstration and Validation (now known as
Program Definition and Risk Reduction) phase of the program. The decision to
develop this prototype, known as a User Operational Evaluation System (UOES),
was driven by three considerations:
1
.
To provide soldiers an opportunity to influence the system's design,
2. To conduct early operational assessments of the system, and
3. If directed by national command authority, to provide a theater
commander-in-chief with a more robust theater missile defense
architecture than exists today. [Ref. 5:p. 16]
The first two factors were to reduce program risk while the last one was to meet a
congressional mandate. [Ref. 5:p. 2] [Ref. 6:p. 67] A contract for the demonstra-
tion and validation (DEMVAL) phase of the program was awarded to Lockheed
Missiles and Space Corporation, now Lockheed Martin Missile and Space
(LMMS), in September 1992. The contract was for the delivery of two UOES
systems and the conduct of 10 flight tests.
C. THAAD SYSTEM COMPONENTS
THAAD is comprised of four major subsystems: the missile, the launcher,
Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence (BMC4I), and the radar.
1. Missile
The missile incorporates a single-stage solid state booster, a kill vehicle
(KV), and a canister. The graphite epoxy canister serves as a housing for the
missile to protect it while in storage or undergoing transport. Once the missile is
hermetically sealed into the canister, it is then ready for loading onto the Palletized
Load System (PLS) Launcher. The booster contains a Thrust Vector Control
(TVC) system and deployable aerodynamic flares. The TVC steers the missile
towards the target in the boost phase. The flares are designed to provide stability
for the missile shortly after launch. When the optimal speed and altitude required
for a successful intercept are achieved, the booster separates from the kill vehicle.
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Critical components of the KV are the gimbal-mounted infrared seeker and the
Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS). The infrared seeker allows the KV
to search for and lock onto the target. Once the seeker acquires the target, the
DACS will provide final steering capability for the KV to intercept the target. The
kill vehicle does not contain a warhead as this has the potential of dispersing
chemical or biological warheads over the defended area. Instead, the KV depends
entirely on kinetic energy to achieve a direct hit kill of its target. [Ref. 7:pp. 1-2]
2. Launcher
A launcher subsystem is mounted on the existing Palletized Load System
(PLS) truck. Use of this system provides commonality with the rest of the Army
and takes advantage of the personnel and equipment savings achieved by PLS.
[Ref. 8:p. 1] Use of PLS as the launch vehicle, also, takes advantage of PLS's
rapid reload capability as demonstrated with current field artillery operational
units. The launcher has been successfully used for the last four flight tests. [Ref.
9:p. 1]
3. BMC4I
The Tactical Operations Station (TOS) and the Launcher Control Station
(LCS) perform Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence. Together these two elements form a Tactical Station
Group (TSG). The TOS handles force operations by providing support for
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planning, analysis, and logistical considerations in addition to supporting engage-
ment operations such as surveillance and battle management. The LCS provides
communication links for the TOS as well as to remote launchers and sensors. The
stations are housed in tactical shelters mounted on High Mobility Multi-purpose
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). [Ref. 10:p. 1]
4. Radar
THAAD radar is a solid-state, phased array, X band radar capable of
multiple tasks. In order to operate as a critical component of the THAAD system,
the radar must acquire and classify targets out to 1000 kilometers, track both target
and interceptor, and provide kill assessment. [Ref. ll:pp. 1-2] Additionally, the
radar provides in-flight targets updates to the missile and BMC4I. The radar has
operated as a back-up radar since flight test three on October 13, 1995. The radar
continued to successfully operate in this "shadow" mode for tests four through six
and was successfully used as the primary radar during flight test seven. [Ref. 9:p.
1]
D. THAAD RADAR PROJECT
1. Overview
THAAD radar began as a separate system in the Ground-Based Radar
(GBR) Project Office. The office was chartered with acquiring a family of radars
that would satisfy the requirements of both a theater and a national missile defense.
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A theater version of the radar was to be provided as Government furnished
equipment (GFE) to the THAAD program. In September 1992, Raytheon received
award of a contract for the DEMVAL phase of the program. As a result of
reduced emphasis on NMD and efforts to consolidate, the GBR project office was
integrated into the THAAD program office in June 1995. [Ref. 3:p. 31]
2. Radar Equipment
To date, one DEMVAL and two UOES radars have been built. The first
DEMVAL radar was never fully operational but was designed as a mock-up.
Subsequently, it has been gutted and used for emplacement training by soldiers.
The UOES radars are operational and used for testing and training at White Sands
Missile Range. [Ref. 12] The radar is comprised of five major elements: the
Operator Control Unit (OCU), Prime Power Unit (PPU), Cooling Equipment Unit
(CEU), Electronics Equipment Unit (EEU), and the Antenna Equipment Unit
(AEU). The configured radar equipment can be seen in Figure 1.
a. Operator Control Unit
The OCU is housed in a standard shelter mounted on a HMMWV.
Inside, the radar operations consoles are used for radar calibration, fault isolation,
missions simulations, and live operations. The prime mover tows a 15-kilowatt
generator that supplies power to the system. Future plans call for the OCU to be
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integrated into the EEU in order to reduce cost and footprint. The OCU is
transportable on the C-130 cargo aircraft. [Ref. 3:p. 32]
b. Prime Power Unit
The radar system's power is provided by the PPU. The 1.1-
megawatt power unit is powered by a 12-cyUnder diesel engine. It is housed in a
weatherproof semitrailer that is towed by a Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical
Truck (HEMTT). It is also transportable on a C-130. [Ref. 3:p. 32]
c. Cooling Equipment Unit
The CEU contains the liquid cooling equipment for the antenna, as
well as the radar system's power distribution unit. Cooling functions are
accomplished through a liquid-to-air heat-exchange system. Redundant pumps
circulate the coolant, a water/glycol mix. Due to a series of valves, maintenance
can be performed on one pump while the other pump supports operations.
Additionally, an oil-fired boiler is incorporated to warm the antenna equipment if
operating in a low temperature environment. [Ref. 3:p. 32]
d. Electronic Equipment Unit
The EEU is a modular trailer designed with a nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) protective system and an environmental control unit to protect the
equipment inside. The electronics consist of signal processing equipment, high-
speed recorders, and data processing equipment. The signal processing equipment
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receives the digitized radar return and performs spectral analysis and preliminary
image processing. The data processing equipment provides computational support
for live missions, simulations, and post-mission data analysis using commercial
off-the-shelf computers. The high-speed recorders provide a log of operator
actions, system updates to the interceptor, and mission profile. [Ref. 3:p. 32]
e. Antenna Equipment Unit
The AEU is the transmitting and receiving element of the system.
The components of the AEU are the antenna assembly and mobilizer assemblies.
The mobilizers are designed for mobility and to orient the antenna aperture for
elevation. The antenna incorporates transmitter/receiver elements, power and
cooling distribution systems, and beam steerers. Each AEU contains 792
Transmit/Receive Element Assemblies (T/REA) which contain signal, power, and
cooling interfaces. T/REAs are designed as line replaceable units (LRUs) for ease
of maintenance in an operational environment. Contained on each T/REA are 32
transmit/receive (T/R) modules. This results in 25,344 transmit/receive modules
per radar, not including spares. [Ref. 13:p. 6]
3. Risk Reduction Efforts
Due to delays in development of the missile, the Program Definition and
Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase of the system acquisition has been extended.











Figure 1. THAAD Radar [Ref. 3:p. 30]
addressing issues it will encounter later in program development. One of these
issues was in the area ofperformance.
During concept exploration, two areas of radar performance were identified
that would not be attainable by prototype radars during PDRR given the
technology available. Relief in the requirements for defended area and
electronic counter-measures were negotiated for the PDRR and UOES
systems. Follow-on radars must, however, meet the thresholds set forth in













Table 1. THAAD ORD Matrix [Ref. 13:p. 4]
Increases in reference range, target handling capability, and in search
volume were needed to meet EMD performance requirements. [Ref. 13:p. 5] In
order to achieve this, it was determined that the radar would need more transmitted
power, more sensitivity, and had to dissipate the same power as the existing UOES
systems. [Ref. 13:p. 6] The key component to doing this was the T/R module.
The project office undertook developmental efforts to explore the switch from
Metal Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor (MESFET) technology to Pseudo-
morphic High Electron Mobility Transistor (PHEMT) technology on the Micro-
wave Monolithic Integrated Circuits (MMIC) of the T/R modules. [Ref. 13:p. 2]
PHEMT technology was relatively new and had yet to be proven in production.
[Ref. 13:p. 6] The research determined that switching to the PHEMT technology
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would yield the necessary performance necessary for EMD while maintaining the
form, fit, and function of the module. [Ref. 13:p. 16] This was important because
a reliance on the MESFET technology to meet EMD performance criteria would
have increased the antenna aperture, prime power requirements, and cooling
requirements. Such increases would have necessitated the redesign of the Antenna
Element, Prime Power Unit, and Cooling Unit. Any redesign would have cost
more and had the potential of increasing the physical dimensions of that equipment
such that it would not be deployable in C-141 aircraft (one of the system
requirements). [Ref. 13 :p. 5] While PHEMT is more technologically advanced,
cost will be comparable to the MESFET module. PHEMT and MESFET MMICs
for this application have similar physical structure and, consequently, use similar
fabrication techniques. A great deal of manufacturing experience with MESFET
modules for the UOES radars has resulted in process improvements that will be
applied to PHEMT module production. These improvements will offset any costs
due to PHEMT technology's more expensive cost of material. [Ref. 13:p. 16] The
result is improved performance at the same cost as the existing module. At a
current cost of $1100 per module, total module costs are $27.88 million for the
T/R modules in just one antenna unit. The next challenge was to reduce the price
of this cost driver to make the radar more affordable.
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
While the threat of Soviet ballistic missiles has gone away, there still exists
many nations possessing or developing a ballistic missile capability. The United
States and its deployed forces are vulnerable to any hostile nation who decides to
employ these weapons. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is charged
with developing systems that will combat these threats. One of the systems
designed to defeat enemy missiles in a tactical theater is THAAD. The radar is the
eyes of the THAAD system. Without acquiring and tracking the target, the system
is ineffective. Due to the long range capability of the system, THAAD radar faces
demanding performance specifications. A critical component in meeting these
high system specifications is the T/R module contained in the antenna equipment
unit. TRPO has already investigated and transitioned from MESFET to PHEMT
technology in order to meet EMD and production performance requirements.






In his June 1994 memorandum, "Specifications and Standards - A New
Way of Doing Business," Secretary of Defense Perry initiated a new era of
acquisition reform. This memorandum outlined his guidance to abandon use of the
existing detailed standards and move toward performance specifications and sound
commercial practices. This memorandum set the tone for the revision of the DOD
5000 series which was published in March 1996. [Ref 14:p. 44] Six major
themes were incorporated into these revised documents. They are teamwork,
tailoring, empowerment, cost as an independent variable, commercial products,
and best practices. The THAAD Radar Project Office (TRPO) has relied on the
reform initiatives of CAIV and commercial product use to achieve reductions in
the cost of a significant cost driver. While it is acknowledged that other acquisi-
tion reform initiatives played a part in this cost reduction effort, the emphasis of
this thesis is on the previously mentioned reforms. This chapter will discuss the
theory behind these acquisition reform initiatives and introduce the risk manage-
ment process.
B. COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Cost as an independent variable (CAIV) is an acquisition philosophy or
strategy that seeks to deliver the greatest amount of performance at an affordable
21
price. CAIV is an umbrella strategy for managing life cycle cost as a key design
parameter. [Ref. 15:p. 6] Included under this umbrella strategy are techniques for
achieving cost goals, as shown in Figure 2. Traditionally, the Program Manager
must balance three key variables in order to be successful: cost, performance, and
schedule. CAIV strives to achieve a balance between life cycle cost, acceptable
performance, and a feasible schedule within acceptable risk. To do this, the CAIV
concept fixes the cost variable causing performance and schedule trade-offs within
the cost constraint.
$$$ Life Cycle Cost Objectives $$$
Figure 2. CAIV Strategy [Ref. 14:p. 6]
1. Establish Trade Space
In the past, weapon system development has allowed performance
requirements and technology to drive cost. The goal of that environment was the
achievement of all the capability that the user wanted. This led to increased cost as
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capability was added. CAIV attempts to reverse that mindset. Given limited
resources, the developer and user must establish trade space given desired system
performance requirements and available funding. This trade space is illustrated in
Figure 3. Key performance parameters (KPP) are characterized by threshold and
objective values. Thresholds are the minimum performance requirements
necessary to fulfill the mission need. Objective values are anything beyond
thresholds that represent a desired capability. As the figure depicts, it is most
desirable to achieve performance at or near performance objectives with low life
cycle cost. The least desirable area is performance at or near the threshold at a
high life cycle cost. The trade space is the area defined by the performance and
cost parameters. Trade-offs within this area must be conducted in order to obtain







| KPP THRESHOLDS |
LIFE CYCLE COST
Figure 3. Establishment of Trade Space [Ref. 15:p. 2]
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A strong user role is required in this process in order to make decisions
regarding cost-performance trade-offs. Dr. Kaminski, Undersecretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology, formed a CAIV Working Group that sought to
better define the principles of CAIV and to outline a process toward achieving the
CAIV objectives. The process includes:
• Setting realistic but aggressive cost objectives early in each
acquisition program.
• Managing risks to achieve cost, schedule, and performance objec-
tives.
• Devising appropriate metrics for tracking progress in setting and
achieving cost objectives.
• Motivating Government and industry managers to achieve program
objectives. [Ref. 17:p. 1]
2. Setting Aggressive Cost Objectives
In line with the acquisition reform initiative of DOD use of sound
commercial practices, DOD should set cost objectives similar to commercial
businesses. In determining a cost objective it is important to note that the CAIV
concept addresses total life cycle cost. In today's budgetary environment, it is easy
to focus on the near term objective of production, or flyaway cost. As a reminder,
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Figure 4. Different Cost Nomenclature [Ref. 17:p. 4]
Establishment of cost objectives should account for available resources,
recent unit costs of similar systems, parametric estimates, developing technology,
developing manufacturing techniques, and improved processes. It is important to
remember that achieving these aggressive cost objectives in the production and
operating phases of the system's life cycle may involve incurring a greater up-front
investment in earlier phases of the program. A return on investment analysis may
be warranted to determine if the up-front investment has merit. [Ref. 17:p. 4]
3. Managing Risk
A challenge to CAIV implementation is the risk associated with aggressive
cost objectives. To effectively implement CAIV in order to achieve lower cost
objectives, risks must be identified and managed. In the past, risk management has
focused on performance. [Ref. 17:p. 5] Pursuit of aggressive cost objectives now
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demand that risk management focus on cost, as well. One method of reducing cost
risk is selecting a contractor who is proposing the use of mature processes. A way
to measure the maturity of a process and the associated cost risk is to construct a
plan that demonstrates achievement of key technologies, processes, and
management techniques toward arriving at the cost objective. [Ref. 17:p. 5] The
Working Group provided an example of such a plan as seen in Table 2.
Factor Indicators
Design Simplification (Mission/Complexity) - Mission simulation
complete
- 80% solution analysis
complete




Technology (cost trends, cost/performance) |- Product available
- Market prices
established
Effective Integration (Errors/Redesign) - 100% 3-D product
model exists
- Test articles available
- Software available




DOD Prototype - Integration verified




Table 2. Factors and Indicators in Reducing Risk [Ref. 17:p. 6]
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The factors all contribute toward mitigation of cost risk. The indicators
provide a measure of achievement for that specific factor. For example, when a
contractor demonstrates a manufacturing process then cost risk associated with that
process is reduced.
Though the Working Group never explicitly states it, the example plan is
one of the first steps in a good risk analysis plan. Table 2 identifies risk events in
the factors column and attempts to quantify those events in the indicator column.
A more formal effort at analyzing risk will be examined in Chapter IV.
4. Metrics
In order for CAIV to work best, it must be implemented early in the
acquisition life cycle where trade-offs of cost and performance can be easily
incorporated in the design. Opportunities to reduce costs should not end there,
however. In order to assist in management of CAIV implementation, the Working
Group encourages the use of metrics and observables. The matrix in Table 3 is an
example of such a tool. Use of such a tool will allow for assessment by manage-
ment on the progress of CAIV initiatives. This matrix is not all encompassing. A
matrix for risk reduction should be established for those areas in which the
program office feels that oversight is warranted.
5. Motivating Managers and Industry
DOD 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAP) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition
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METRIC OBSERVABLE
• Are cost objectives defined and
consistent with requirements
programmed and projected fiscal
resources?
- Out-year resources identified? ($)
- Production and O&S cost objectives
included in the RFP?
- Key tradeoff issues addressed?
• Is DoD managing to achieve cost
objectives?
- Request For Proposal (RFP) contains a strict
minimum number of performance
specifications?
- Cost/Performance-Integrated Product Team
(IPT) functioning; tradeoff space identified
in program baseline and RFP?
- Risks to achieve cost objectives identified
and program steps to address these defined?
(risk plan
)
- Incentives for achieving cost objectives
included in the RFP and contract? ( %
relative to total contract $'s )
- Mechanism for contractor suggestions to
reduce production and O&S costs in place
and operating?
- Allocation of cost objectives provided to
IPTs and key suppliers
- Measurement and estimation of reliability
and maintainability
- Robust contractor incentives plan in place?
• Are contractors managing to
achieve cost objectives?
- Providing appropriate tools for cost-
performance tradeoffs (including incentives
for corporate management) and participates
in cost-performance tradeoff process
- Identifying (and when appropriate
implements) new technologies and
manufacturing processes that can reduce
costs
- Identifying procedural/process impediments
to cost reduction measures
- Establishing strong relationship with vendor
base, including sound incentives structure
Table 3. Metrics and Observables [Ref. 17: p. 8]
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Programs, requires CAIV be addressed in all acquisition strategies. It specifies in
Part 3, paragraph 3.3.4,
CAIV is a process that helps arrive at cost objectives (including life-
cycle costs) and helps the requirements community set performance
objectives. The CAIV process shall be used to develop an
acquisition strategy for acquiring and operating affordable DOD
systems by setting aggressive, achievable cost objectives and
managing achievement of these objectives. Cost objectives shall
also be set to balance mission needs with projected out-year
resources, taking into account anticipated process improvements in
both DOD and defense industries. [Ref 18]
Furthermore, Army Regulation 70-1, Research, Development, and
Acquisition Army Acquisition Policy, echoes DOD policy in that CAIV be
applied to acquisition category (ACAT) I, II, and III programs and be used as a
guideline for ACAT IV programs. [Ref. 19] Program Managers, therefore, are
obligated to implement CAIV. However, CAIV will be difficult to implement
unless the Program Managers and contractors are motivated to seek realistic and
significant cost objectives. The CAIV Working Group states that,
the Program Manager needs the encouragement of the users, CAEs
(Component Acquisition Executive), and DAE (Defense Acquisition
Executive) to accept risks associated with aggressive cost objectives,
and promotion policies must recognize and reward good tries as well
as successes...by far the best incentive for managers is an
environment that promotes goal setting, teamwork, and recognition
of accomplishments from the management chain. [Ref. 17:p. 6]
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Encouragement to take risk may not be enough, though. In a zero-defect
environment, "good tries" may be translated as failures. In an interview, Dr.
Kaminski describes a hypothetical situation in which a PM invests funds today to
reduce life cycle cost. He states,
If the system operates in a way so that a Service or a PEO or a
Program Manager has to put up funds today to make that
improvement, and then when the out-year savings are realized those
funds are swept up by the financial community or elsewhere and
those funds are not available to the program or to the Service, then
you have to ask yourself, 'Why do that? Why take this risk of
investing up-front dollars and not be able to realize any benefits
downstream?* [Ref. 20:p. 11]
He advocates returning a portion of those savings back to the organization in order
to create an environment where PMs will take risk. [Ref. 20:p. 11]
Motivating industry to reduce cost is a difficult task, also. Dr. Kaminski
stated, "I cannot help but wonder where the incentives are in the system for the
producer to reduce unit price when that is simply going to result in less revenue."
[Ref. 20:p. 11] According to the CAIV Working Group, the answer to this lies in
competition. Competition to attain business and associated profit can be used to
motivate industry toward achieving cost objectives. In order to initiate
competition, the request for proposal (RFP) should include cost objectives for the
system. Based on the stated cost objectives, the offerors may then provide credible
solutions with acceptable risk. In order to maximize the leverage of competition, it
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should be employed as long as reasonably possible in the acquisition cycle. [Ref.
17:p. 7]
Once a contractor is selected, there are a variety of mechanisms to motivate
it toward cost savings. Mechanisms include contract incentives and value
engineering programs. The contract can be structured such that continuing efforts
to reduce cost are rewarded. Depending on the acquisition phase, a fixed price
incentive fee or cost plus incentive fee contract may be appropriate. In lieu of
incentive fees, award fees may be offered that place emphasis on achieving cost or
on cost reduction efforts as part of award fee criteria. [Ref. 17:p. 7]
Value engineering is the analysis of a program or product by a contractor in
order to improve life cycle cost. There are two approaches to value engineering.
The first is an incentive arrangement where a contractor voluntarily uses its own
resources to develop and submit change proposals that will reduce life cycle cost.
The contractor will share in any savings if the change proposal is accepted. The
other approach is mandatory value engineering. In this approach, the Government
requires and pays for a specific level of contractor effort associated with any value
engineering efforts. As with the voluntary approach, the contractor shares in
savings, but at a much lower rate. [Ref. 21 :Part 48, para. 101] An alternative way
to motivate the contractor is by appealing to its corporate financial and market
strategy. This will be addressed in the next section.
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C. COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS
This acquisition reform principle acknowledges the shrinking defense
industrial base. Faced with declining defense budgets, traditional defense
contractors have had to expand into commercial markets in order to survive. This
trend has resulted in DOD no longer being a dominant customer. DOD can no
longer exercise its influence as a large customer to get what it wants. [Ref. 22 :p.
7] Additionally, DOD has recognized the cost and time savings if development of
an item can be avoided by purchase of a commercially available item that meets a
validated need. Transfer of commercial items, technologies, and processes for a
military need describes what has become known as dual-use technologies.
Most often the trend for technology transfer within a dual-use technology
concept involves the application of a commercial product or process to a program.
Recent legislation encourages technology transfer between commercial and
Government endeavors. [Ref. 23:pp. 22-23] There are many cases, however,
where defense technology is used to build or improve a commercial capability.
Supporting this idea, Executive Order 12591 states that "the head of each
Executive department and agency, to the extent permitted by law, shall encourage
and facilitate collaboration among Federal laboratories, State and local govern-
ments, universities, and the private sector, particularly small business, in order to
assist in the transfer of technology to the marketplace." [Ref. 24]
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1. Benefits of Dual-Use Technology To DOD
If a DOD capability is transferred to a commercial segment, DOD benefits
in three ways. First, DOD benefits due to the economies of scale generated by the
commercialization of the product. These economies of scale should result in a
lower unit cost for DOD. Second, commercialization helps to maintain production
of the item should it be necessary for future defense needs. In the past, DOD
requirements normally generated small production runs of an item. In order to
maintain the manufacturing capability for future use, DOD would pay a price. If a
manufacturer achieves commercial success with a DOD product, then the commer-
cial segment maintains the manufacturing base and DOD does not bear the cost.
Finally, commercial application of military hardware may motivate manufacturers
to seek improvements of the product in order to appeal to the commercial sector.
Furthermore, the manufacturer may seek ways in which to reduce the manufac-
turing cost of the product in order to improve its profit. Such improvements can
benefit DOD by improving performance of the product or lowing procurement
costs on subsequent buys. [Ref. 22 :p. 19]
2. Benefits of Dual-Use Technology To Industry
Adaptation of a defense technology to a commercial market may greatly
benefit the manufacturer, as well. Minimizing or eliminating development costs
for an item improves the firm's profit and return on investment. Investment by
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DOD to improve the performance or reduce the cost of a high technology item fits
in perfectly with a firm's financial and market strategy.
Roland Calori formulated a model (see Figure 5) to describe the































Figure 5. Differentiation and Impact on Cost [Ref. 23: p. 25]
emerging industries. Porter first described emerging industry as one with
technological newness and uncertainty. [Ref. 25 :p. 22] Calori states that,
"emerging industries may be in the introduction or growth phase and they have
several high differentiation opportunities based on research and development."
High technology is defined in terms of entry barriers into the industry. These entry
barriers are characterized by:
• A high minimum critical mass of research and development
• High research and development costs
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• High technological uncertainty (products and processes)
• Technological knowledge is difficult to find on the labor market
In this model, differentiation is a result of product innovation, process
innovation, and adaptation to new market segments. Adaptation and product
innovation garner a larger market share that leads to greater economies of scale.
Greater economies of scale, in turn, can lead to a reduction in unit cost. Innovation
of the process may also lead to reduced manufacturing cost. This reduced cost
may lead to new markets and the cycle repeats. Product differentiation can be
exhibited through quality, delivery time, enhanced features, greater performance,
or even lower cost. Efforts to improve the performance of a product and reduce
unit cost will serve to differentiate the product. [Ref. 25 :p. 25]
An example of a DOD technology that has been applied to a commercial
market is the FOREWARN© system installed on school buses. This system
makes use ofMMIC technology developed by DOD's Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) for military radars and communications. At the time this
technology was developed, the Air Force chose a phased-array radar that uses
MMICs for the F-22. Delco Electronics, a subsidiary of then General Motors
Hughes Electronics, saw the potential for such technology in a commercial
application. This application was collision avoidance for vehicles; more
specifically, in school buses which have large blind spots immediately in front.
Each year, there are fatalities when children are run over by their own bus. The
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FOREWARN© system senses objects and alerts the driver of the obstruction.
Delco Electronics benefited in the Air Force's expenditure of funds in the
development of the technology, while the Air Force benefits in the volume that the
commercial market will bring to the production ofMMICs. [Ref. 22:p. 20]
D. RISK MANAGEMENT
As stated in the Defense Acquisition Deskbook, "Inherent in the CAIV
concept is the realization that risks are present and must be managed in order to
achieve performance, schedule, and cost objectives." [Ref. 26] An understanding
of the risk management process is necessary before undertaking any cost saving
initiative. Figure 6 provides an overview of the risk management process.
Risk
Management
Risk Risk Risk Risk







Figure 6. Risk Management Structure [Ref. 27:p. 5]
"Risk is the measure of the potential inability to achieve overall program
objectives." [Ref. 27:p. 5] Risk management is the practice of dealing with risk.
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It is comprised of the four elements seen in Figure 6. Risk planning deals with
developing an overall strategy for dealing with risk in a program. Risk assessment
is subdivided between identification and analysis. Risk identification is the
process of examining the program areas and identifying potentially risk areas.
Risk analysis determines the impact of each of the identified risk areas on the
program in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. Once the impact of an event
is determined, methods to reduce risk to acceptable levels are examined. These
methods are known as risk handling methods. Risk monitoring occurs after risk
handling techniques are implemented. Risk monitoring attempts to track and
evaluate the effectiveness of these techniques against established metrics such as
those outlined by the CAIV Working Group. Finally, all risk management
activities should be documented during the process. This is illustrated as risk
documentation in the figure. [Ref. 27:pp. 4-5]
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Within the last five years a revolution has occurred in the acquisition of
weapon systems for DOD. Spurred by Dr. Perry's efforts, the acquisition
community has looked toward commercial business for ways to acquire equipment
better, cheaper, and faster. These acquisition reform initiatives have been
incorporated into Department guidance for the acquisition of systems. THAAD
Radar Product Office used two of these initiatives to initiate a cost saving effort.
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They are CAIV and the use of commercial products as embodied by dual-use
technology. CAIV is not simply a technique that one applies, but instead, a
philosophy for managing life cycle cost of a system. The pursuit of aggressive
cost objectives brings with it a certain amount of risk. The amount of risk must be
identified and reduced to acceptable levels before efforts are undertaken. The risk
management process plays a critical role toward that end. The use of commercial
products implies dual-use technology. Dual-use technology goes two ways,
however. Normally, dual-use means the application of commercial items to meet a
military need. There are many instances where military items have been modified
for use in the commercial market. It will be shown in the next chapter that the





In early 1998, the idea for a Best of Breed (BoB) T/R module study took
root. The study was to investigate methods to produce a less expensive module
than was currently being used in the radar. The tenets of CAIV will be used to
analyze this initiative. Additionally, the dual-use nature of T/R module tech-
nology will be addressed as a motivator for the contractor. Finally, an assessment
of risk to program cost, schedule, and performance will be conducted.
Development of the scope ofwork (SOW) for the BoB study began in April
and was completed in early May 1998. It is important to note that SOW
development was done jointly in conjunction with Raytheon, subcontractor for the
radar. THAAD Radar Product Office has contracted with Mitre Corporation for
the consultation services of a microelectronics expert. This expert has provided
TRPO with valuable input into areas of potential cost savings for the radar. A
request for quotation (RFQ) was sent to THAAD's prime contractor, LMMS, on 7
June 1998. The study began in late July 1998 as an adjunct to the existing
LMMS/Raytheon contract. [Ref. 28]
The SOW contains four ground rules for development of the low cost
module (LCM) concept. These ground rules are:
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1. The THAAD Antenna Equipment array architecture will not be
affected below the T/REA level.
2. Technology and processes consistent with current insertion points.
3. The recurring cost estimate for the module concept(s) will be
developed from a detailed cost analysis based on experience where
available and recognized cost models where new processes,
materials, etc. are required.
4. The contractor will mitigate risk in his approach by avoiding
speculative technologies, maintaining parallel approaches where
appropriate, and by a thorough and careful analysis of estimated
module costs. [Ref. 29]
B. TRADE SPACE
THAAD Radar Product Office did not seek to establish trade space in the
classic CAIV sense. The acquisition strategy for the radar called for increased
performance for the next acquisition phase. Due to this increase, TRPO did not
have performance to trade off to reduce cost. Cost reductions had to come from a
source other than performance trade-offs.
C. COST OBJECTIVE FOR BEST OF BREED STUDY
The SOW states as its primary objective the definition of a module "that
will provide significantly lower cost for production while meeting or exceeding
EMD performance." [Ref. 29] Reduction in cost of the T/R module impacts not
only production cost of the radar, but also spares. Recall that T/REAs were
designed as line replaceable units. With 32 T/R modules per T/REA, reduction in
40
unit cost of each module will affect the support costs of the system in the future.
Later, it defines "significantly lower" as "greater than 2:1 reduction in cost.. .for
LRIP and beyond." [Ref. 29] A 50% reduction in the cost of a significant cost
driver can certainly be deemed aggressive. Of greater interest is how they arrived
at this goal. Recent improvements in the contractor's knowledge base and costs of
similar components of different programs served as a starting point for establishing
the cost objective.
Much has been written about recent mergers within the defense industry.
Conventional wisdom suggests that with the creation of mega-corporations
through mergers that competition will be reduced. [Ref. 30:p. 25] [Ref. 31:p. 2]
There may be, however, a period following these mergers that acquisition
managers may take advantage of the recent conglomeration of talent and
technologies now under one roof. Companies that previously brought different
approaches to a system under a rivalous relationship may now be merged into one
corporation. In a competitive proposal environment, federal acquisition
regulations prevent Government officials from revealing competitor's technical
approaches and processes to others. Once acquired through merger, the Program
Manager may direct the examination ofwhat was once a rival's approach.
Just this situation occurred in the BoB module study. Recent acquisition by
Raytheon of Hughes Electronic Systems and Texas Instruments Defense Company
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pooled a large amount of expertise in MMIC manufacturing technology. Realizing
the potential for cost reduction due to the increased knowledge base of Raytheon,
the TRPO initiated this study. [Ref. 28]
Familiarity with technological advances in chip manufacturing also drove
the setting of cost objectives. TRPO was aware the prices of T/R module being
worked on by Raytheon West (formerly Hughes) and Raytheon East in
conjunction with the Navy Affordable Module program. Estimated cost for this
module was $300. While this module did not meet all of the THAAD radar
performance requirements, it did illustrate the feasibility of a low cost module.
Other developing programs using T/R modules, such as the F-22 module program
and the HF-4 module program were looked at as benchmarks as well. [Ref. 28]
In order to achieve these cost objectives, TRPO realized that it may incur an
investment up-front to develop the technology necessary to reduce life cycle cost.
The BoB study was designed not only to determine the feasibility of reducing the
module unit cost, but also to determine the investment required to do so. Once this
is known, analysis can be done to determine the merit of the cost reduction efforts.
D. MANAGING RISK IN THE BOB STUDY
In implementing any cost saving initiative care must be taken so that the
baseline is not increased. In the case of BoB, the baseline was the current cost,
schedule, and performance of the existing PHEMT T/R module. This meant that
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any concept must not cost more than $1100 per module, the module must meet
EMD performance specifications, and insertion of the LCM must not cause a
production slip of the currently scheduled first LRIP radar beginning in FY2003.
Rule one stated that the THAAD AE array architecture will not be affected
below the T/REA level. In other words, T/REAs with the LCM will have the same
form, fit, and function (F3) as the current PHEMT T/REAs. [Ref. 29] As
discussed previously, any change in the T/REA F3 may necessitate a costly
redesign of the antenna equipment. Redesign of this component may drive a
redesign of the power unit and/or the cooling unit. Also, any increase in size, due
to a redesign, may violate the current transportability requirement. In stipulating
this rule in the SOW, TRPO stabilized the physical architecture of the radar
system. In doing so, they reduced the risk of incurring high costs, schedule slips,
and transportability problems potentially associated with a redesign of the antenna
array.
The second rule addressed concerns with the maturity of the examined
technologies and processes necessary to achieve the cost objectives. As the CAJV
Working Group points out in their paper, "...production cost objectives can only be
achieved by demonstrating and bringing to maturity key manufacturing processes."
[Ref. 17] With this in mind the rule caused only technologies and processes that
will be sufficiently mature at the desired insertion points to be used. There are two
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options for insertion of the LCM into the radars. Option one is for two sub-arrays
populated with the LCMs to be inserted into the second EMD radar prior to near-
field range calibration. This will provide test data for the module prior to insertion
into production radars. The second option is for the first LRIP radar to be fully
populated with LCMs. [Ref. 29] In creating this parameter for the study, TRPO
mitigated its risk in the areas of schedule and cost. In stipulating this rule, TRPO
sought to avoid speculative technologies that will not be mature at the desired
point of insertion. If a pursued technology or process is not mature when wanted,
there are two alternatives. The first is to delay the schedule until the technology is
mature. Normally, delays translate into increased costs. This is an unattractive
alternative for a program that is already very expensive and years behind schedule.
The other alternative is to insert the LCMs into later radars. In other words, if the
technology to produce the LCM is not ready by LRIP 1, then produce the LRIP 1
radar with the $1100 module and insert the LCM into the next radar after
technology maturation. The problem with this option is that every radar produced
without the LCM is an opportunity lost. Each radar produced with the $1100
module instead of the LCM is $13.9 million more expensive. If too many
opportunities are lost the return on investment becomes suspect. Rule two sought
to avoid these pitfalls by requiring use of viable, mature technologies and
processes when they are needed.
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Rule three addressed the cost projections of the study. It required the
contractor to provide a detailed cost analysis for the recurring costs of a production
LCM. Historical data was to be used when available and recognized cost models
used for any new processes and materials. Use of such data provided a more
accurate and reliable unit cost on which to base decision making. [Ref. 29]
Provision of this data will allow TRPO to conduct a cost realism analysis. In so
doing, they will be able to determine the viability of achieving the cost estimate
given the concept. Approval of the cost data after analysis by cost analysts will
reduce the risk of the cost estimates being revised upward over time. Verification
of the cost data will also allow life cycle cost savings to be predicted more
accurately. Reliable cost savings data is critical when performing investment
analysis.
Another component critical to investment analysis is the initial investment.
The SOW required the contractor to develop and submit cost estimates for non-
recurring effort associated with development of the LCM. These estimates will
also be subject to cost realism analysis in order to be used as a basis for budgeting
and analysis.
Finally, rule four directly addressed risk mitigation. In mandating the
avoidance of speculative technologies, maintaining parallel approaches, and
analyzing carefully all estimated module costs, TRPO covered risk to cost,
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schedule, and performance. Speculative technologies imply technologies or
processes that are currently theory and have not yet been proven feasible. Use of
such technology would incur great risk - risk in the development of the technology
costing more than initially estimated; risk in the technology not achieving the
estimated cost savings; risk in the technology not yielding the expected
performance; and risk in the technology taking longer to develop than initially
anticipated. All of these risks jeopardize meeting the Acquisition Program
Baseline (APB) for cost, performance, and schedule.
The parallel approach requirement also sought to reduce risk in cost,
performance, and schedule. The SOW states, "The BoB concept can be one or
more module embodiments if a 'multi-prong approach' helps mitigate the risk...."
[Ref. 29] The contractor is not locked in to one solution. If more than one
solution looked promising, then both could be pursued in order to spread the risk.
If more than one viable approach is developed, the greater the chance that one
approach will produce the desired cost, schedule, and performance. In this
manner, a parallel approach could reduce the risk of not achieving the goal.
Finally, rule four addressed the topic of estimating costs. This appears to be
a reinforcement of rule three but, also served as a reminder to the contractor to be
accurate and complete in cost estimating. Introduction of risk due to poor cost
estimates is anathema to the concepts ofCAIV and cost reduction.
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E. METRICS IN ACHIEVING COST OBJECTIVE
Analysis of this initiative is occurring during the concept study phase. As
of this date, the study has been completed and cost reduction ideas to achieve the
target cost proposed. The decision to fund this initiative and proceed with the
LCM concept is pending. As such, development of metrics to track progress is
premature. Should approval be granted and funds obligated, metrics should be
instituted immediately in order to monitor progress in achieving the cost objective
with the stated performance within the timeline established. The table of metrics
presented earlier is a good starting point. This table should be tailored, however,
to cover the particulars of this initiative. Use of an earned value (EV) system
tailored to this initiative may also be beneficial in determining progress.
F. MOTIVATING GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY MANAGERS
1. Government Managers
Regulatory mandate for the use of CAIV was not the genesis of TRPO's
efforts with the BoB study. Motivation to reduce cost in this effort was driven by
external pressures. LTG Lyles, the BMDO Director, presented THAAD Program
Office with a challenge to reduce cost. [Ref. 28] The challenge was an outgrowth
of the reduced funding that THAAD received for FY 1999. With no intercepts in
five attempts, public and Congressional support is beginning to wane.
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FY 97 FY98 FY 99
Budget Request $481.8 $556.1 $821.7
Appropriated $621.8 $406.1 $387.1
Table 4. THAAD Funding for FY97-99 (TY, $M) [Ref. 32]
Congressional support for THAAD is decreasing as evidenced by its
reduced funding as shown in Table 4. In response to these funding reductions,
ways had to be found to reduce cost. Analysis of costs by the THAAD Project
Office revealed that 85% of costs for future production were associated with the
missile and the radar as illustrated in Figure 7. [Ref. 33 :p. 3] These two cost
drivers were candidates for cost reductions. Examination of the radar reveals that
















Missile and Radar are 85% of Production Contract Cost
Figure 7. Breakdown of Cost Drivers [Ref. 33:p. 3]
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A survey of service efforts in T/R module technology showed a wide
disparity in costs. Granted each service was developing a module for vastly
different missions, but LTG Lyles felt that common items should be closer in cost
than they currently were. [Ref. 28] All of these pressures have served to motivate
managers to seek ways to reduce cost.
Lacking external pressure, there is little incentive to seek cost reduction.
Other than the regulatory requirement to implement CAIV, there is little incentive
for Program Managers to aggressively pursue cost reduction. This lack of
incentive is due, in large part, by the fiscal Darwinism that has become the reality
today. We hear stories telling managers to obligate funds early, for if you don't
the comptroller will surely take those funds. We are reminded to build in a
management reserve but not to call it such or it will be taken away. Dr. Kaminski
admits that the financial community sweeps up out-year savings realized from
today's cost saving initiatives. In the aggregate, a Program Manager is rated on
how well he manages the cost, schedule, and performance parameters of a system
while under his leadership. Given the conditions described before, what PM
would risk his career in pursuit of cost objectives that are inexorably tied to
performance and schedule? Once cost objectives are set, they can now be used as
the basis for program funding. For a program that already had a funding baseline,
reductions to that baseline based on new cost targets become fair game for the
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financial community. This leaves the PM without a safety net should there be
difficulties in the development of the cost saving idea. The PM would be more
motivated if some of those funds remained at the program office as a reserve in
case developmental problems were encountered. The current environment does
not motivate PMs to seek large cost reductions, if any at all. Instead, they will
seek small reductions with corresponding minimal risk. In order to achieve large,
meaningful reductions, the PM must have a sense that funding is available if he or
she gets in trouble.
2. Motivating Industry
Industry gathers its motivation to reduce cost from many sources.
Influences such as customer interest and encouragement, competition, contract
incentives, and ability to increase market share all motivate industry to seek cost
reductions of a product. [Ref. 34] Additionally, reductions to manufacturing costs
have the potential to improve profit.
In this case, the BoB study was initiated by the TRPO in response to the
pressures discussed earlier. In trying to meet the customer's needs, Raytheon
undertook the study. In doing so, they also meet their own needs. As discussed
previously, the SOW for this study was developed jointly between the contractor
and TRPO. One of the many benefits of working jointly is that each side gains
insight into the concerns of the other. This knowledge and efforts on this contract
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give Raytheon an advantage over its competition for future contracts. Discussions
with TRPO also revealed that TRPO plans on using a cost-plus award fee contract
for EMD. Award fee structure will probably incentivize module cost savings.
[Ref. 12] Cost reduction efforts that Raytheon undertakes now will benefit them
when they enter the EMD phase of the program.
Competition with other manufacturers also motivates Raytheon to seek cost
reductions. Raytheon understands that if they don't seek to reduce cost, their
competitors will. If their competitors do reduce the cost, then Raytheon will lose
the business and any associated profits. [Ref. 34]
The final area that motivates contractors to reduce cost deals with financial
and market strategies. A lower priced product with equal or better performance
than a competitor's will increase market share. Greater analysis of this factor as a
motivator for Raytheon will be conducted in the next section.
G. DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY
The model in Chapter III will be used to analyze one of the motivating
factors for Raytheon. The industry needs to be high technology in nature in order
for this model to apply. The applications of PHEMT technology to MMICs is a
relatively new technique. Combine this technology with the high operating





























Figure 8. Modified Model
technology industry. DOD investment in PHEMT technology and the BoB study
has allowed Raytheon to explore innovation of product and process with little risk
to Raytheon, given the cost-plus award fee contract. Following the model, as
illustrated in Figure 8, product innovation in the area of increased performance due
to PHEMT technology will lead to an increase in markets. Increased markets lead
to higher manufacturing rates where scale economies and the learning effect drive
unit cost down. Likewise, any process innovation as a result of efforts on a low
cost module for TRPO will result in lower unit production costs for T/R modules.
In discussing Raytheon's motivation for undertaking the BoB study, Mr.
Joseph Neville, Raytheon T/R module manager, states,
Military applications ofPHEMT technology are the most demanding
and technologically sophisticated, given the frequencies at which we
must operate. Less sophisticated PHEMT applications at lower
frequencies therefore benefit from Uncle Sam's prior investment and
contractor experience gained, and open up commercial markets. But
Uncle Sam wins too since building high volume commercial chips in
our foundry lowers the cost of all chips, including Government
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product, even though it comes nowhere near commercial volumes.
[Ref. 34]
Mr. Neville sums up nicely the benefits of dual-use technology to both the
Government and industry. Raytheon benefits in DOD's investment in technology
and cost reduction efforts. This reduces their development costs and improves
their profit margin for the product. As Mr. Neville stated, it also opens up
potentially new markets for Raytheon to exploit.
Some commercial markets that benefit from Raytheon's T/R module
research include air traffic control and telecommunications. An example of a
telecommunications system is IRIDIUM©. IRIDIUM© is a global telecommuni-
cations network that uses T/R modules in its antenna to transmit information to
subscribers around the world. Raytheon was selected to develop the main mission
antenna and produces the L-band T/R modules with PHEMT technology for the
system. [Ref. 34] [Ref. 35]
The Government benefits as well. Now as a low volume customer, DOD
benefits from the production of T/R modules for commercial applications.
Combined, the production of military and commercial T/R modules allows the




The BoB study is complete and Raytheon found that the cost objective can
be achieved. Cost reductions come from improvement in yield of PHEMT
MMICs, integration of several MMMICs into a single MMIC, and reduction in the
size of the T/R module. Integrating the MMICs and reducing the size of the
module will reduce the material and labor costs necessary for manufacturing. This
cost reduction does not come cheaply, however. The study determined that
development of the low cost module would take three years at a cost of
approximately $8 million per year. This up-front investment would yield cost
savings in the production of EMD, low-rate initial production (LRIP), and full rate
production (FRP) radars. Recent schedule slips in the program would enable full
population of the first EMD radar with the low cost module if efforts began
immediately. This schedule slip will allow cost savings to be achieved on two
more radars then originally anticipated. [Ref. 12]
Calculation of the net present value (NPV) of this investment will
determine if it makes sound business sense. An investment with a negative NPV
would be of little value. Current plans call for the production of two EMD, four
LRIP, and seven FRP radars for a total of 13 more radars. With an estimated
average unit production price for each T/R module of $550, the savings will be
approximately $13.9 million per radar compared to using the current T/R module
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with a price of $1 100. Using a 5.38% discount rate (current treasury rate for a 10
year bond), calculation of the net present value of this initiative results in a
savings of $78.9 million in current year dollars. [Ref. 36] Further calculation
reveals an internal rate of return (IRR) of 34% if this cost saving effort is
undertaken and realized. This NPV and IRR are based on production cost savings
only. Recalling that CAIV is concerned with life cycle costs, a better calculation
of these figures would include the savings in spares. At the time this research was
conducted, data on spares over the life of the system was unavailable. Inclusion of
spare cost savings in these calculations would cause the NPV and IRR to only
increase if usage rates were comparable. Sound business sense tells you that
anticipated returns alone should not influence investment. Another element to
consider is the risk involved in the investment. The investment may be wasted if
the liklehood of achieving success is low. Analysis of the risk involved in the
project should be conducted to determine if the investment should be made.
I. RISK ASSESSMENT
Essential to setting realistic cost objectives is an understanding of the risks
involved in order to reach that cost objective. In examining TRPO's efforts on this
initiative, it was found that no risk assessment had been conducted. TRPO
accepted Raytheon's assessment of the proposed concepts as low risk and this
assessment was validated by an Independent Review Team. However, no separate
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formal effort was taken to determine the risk associated with implementing the
recommendations of the BoB study.
According to the DSMC risk management process, risk assessment is a two-
step process. The first step is risk identification followed by analysis. Risk
identification serves to identify the risks inherent to the project and describe them
in an understandable way. One method is to brainstorm the tasks to be
accomplished and in this manner, identify those activities that may contain risk.
Another, more structured method is to use the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
to identify risk events. The WBS is used to do this because it includes all activities
associated with completion of a project and provides an encompassing structure.
Each identified event falls into a category of cost, schedule, or performance for
evaluation. The next step is to analyze the risks. [Ref. 27 :pp. 10-14]
In analyzing risk, two components must be addressed. The first is the
likelihood of the event occurring. The second is, given that the event occurs, what
is its impact on the program in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. The
DSMC Risk Management Guide recommends that a group of experts familiar with
the risk areas accomplish these ratings. The criteria they use for rating each
component of risk should be based on experience and include a range of
possibilities in order to discriminate adequately. Once the risk events are rated
according to the criteria, a plot of event likelihood versus consequence can be
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made for each of the categories of cost, schedule, and performance. [Ref. 27:pp.
15-17] In the past, there has been a tendency to assign numerical importance to
the criteria and to develop a single number to portray the risk. This is possible if
both scales used cardinal values that reflect absolute numerical differences
between ratings. Often, ordinal scales are used to assess risk. These scales
measure relative standing between ratings and not absolute numerical differences.
Attempts to perform mathematical operations and assign an overall numerical risk
value when using ordinal scales is wrong and could be misleading. [Ref. 27 :p. 17]
Risk events for the Best of Breed assessment were created through
brainstorming, as no WBS was available. Input from experts within the TRPO
was solicited and incorporated into the questionnaire. The questionnaire
(Appendix) was sent to TRPO with instructions to assess the impact to the overall
program if the implementation of the BoB study results were pursued. The criteria
in Tables 5 and 6 were used to assess risk on the implementation of the Best of
Breed study results. [Ref. 27:pp. 15-16] A matrix containing combinations of
consequence and likelihood ratings assigned an overall rating of high, medium,
and low was used. [Ref. 27 :p. 16] See Figure 9. TRPO responses were plotted
for the areas of cost, schedule, and performance. These plots are illustrated in
Figures 10-12. In this case, ordinal scales were used and, as discussed earlier, any
attempt to develop a single number for risk would be misleading. Instead,
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comparison of the plots to the matrix in Figure 9 was done to determine an overall
risk rating for the category.
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Figure 9. Overall Risk Rating [Ref. 26: p. 17]
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Table 5. Likelihood Criteria [Ref. 27: p. 16]
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Severity of Consequence
Given that the risk is realized, what is the magnitude of the impact?
Cost Schedule Performance Rating
<5% Minimal or no impact Minimal or no impact 1
5 % - 10%
Additional resources
required; able to meet
dates
Acceptable with some
reduction in margin 2
11%- 15%
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Figure 12. Schedule Risk Matrix
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Analysis of the cost risk matrix reveals that the majority of risk events were
evaluated as low risk. There are some risk events that fall in the moderate risk
category, however. They are:
• Implementation of recommendations requires state-of-the-art
advances.
• Contractor experiences loss of key personnel in technical and
management positions for the design, engineering, and
manufacturing ofLCM.
• Program Office lacks funding for LCM development.
While the majority of cost risk events were evaluated as low, an overriding
concern is one of initiative funding. Funding was evaluated as a medium cost risk.
Without funding none of the other events are even realizable. Based on this one
event, cost risk is assessed as medium. Analysis of the performance risk matrix
shows that all of the evaluated events fall into the area of low risk and, therefore,
receives an overall rating of low. Finally, similar results from the cost risk matrix
can be found in the schedule risk matrix. The majority of risk events for schedule
fall in the low risk area with three events falling in the moderate risk area. Those
three events are the same three that elevate risk in the cost area and should be paid
special attention.
Once areas of elevated risk are identified, then risk handling techniques
must be addressed. Risk handling relates to methods and techniques to deal with
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known risks. Options for risk handling include risk avoidance, risk control, risk
transfer, and risk assumption. [Ref. 27:p. 17]
Risk avoidance seeks to eliminate areas of high risk by following a lower
risk solution. [Ref. 27:p. 18] In this case, the BoB study and its recommendations
are a parallel solution to the existing PHEMT module. Avoidance of all risk to
schedule and performance is already covered by the existing technology.
Risk created by reliance on state-of-the-art advances requires control of the
risk. Risk control seeks to reduce or mitigate risk. [Ref. 27:p. 18] In this case,
use of an earned value (EV) system to monitor progress on the pursuit of the LCM
would highlight areas of concern before they become a problem. Use of metrics as
suggested in Chapter II, to monitor achievement of critical events in the
development of the LCM, would also be useful.
Risk control may also be used to mitigate the loss of key contractor
personnel for the design, engineering, and manufacturing of the LCM. The
contractor should be made to identify key personnel in the development of the
LCM and to notify TRPO when one of those key people is shifted to another
project or leaves the contractor.
The third area of elevated risk has been assumed by TRPO. In assuming
risk, TRPO acknowledges the existence that they might not receive funding for
this initiative and have accepted it. Overall, this assumption of risk does not affect
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the program given the existence of the PHEMT module which meets current
performance, cost, and schedule baselines.
Overall the risk of implementing the BoB recommendations into the
existing program is low. This should come as no surprise given the ground rules
spelled out in the SOW. These rules addressed the mitigation of risk and caused
the contractor to pursue a low risk solution. An understanding of the
recommended solution shows that Raytheon is mainly repackaging the current
module into a smaller one in order to reduce labor and material costs [Ref. 12].
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Analysis of the Best of Breed study shows that the acquisition reform
initiatives of Cost As an Independent Variable and dual-use technology were
critical to the success of this cost saving initiative. In pursuing this effort, THAAD
Radar Product Office was able to use the tenets of CAIV as outlined by the DOD
CAIV Working Group to reduce the cost of a major cost driver without sacrificing
performance or schedule. Critical to this success was the motivation of the
contractor derived in part from the dual-use nature of the T/R module. The
applicability of the this item to commercial segments motivated the contractor to
seek reductions in the cost of the item. Furthermore, in keeping with the CAIV
principle of managing risk, TRPO was able to constrain the study such that only
low risk solutions would be recommended. Assessment of the risks involved in
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implementing the study's recommended solution reinforces the low risk nature of
this effort.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis is an examination of the THAAD Radar Product Office's efforts
at reducing the cost of a major cost driver of the radar and the risk of doing so.
THAAD Radar Product Office (TRPO) has successfully proven the viability of
achieving great cost reductions of a major cost driver with a low risk approach.
Analysis of this effort within the framework of the tenets of Cost As an
Independent Variable reveals that this is a unique opportunity. Due to an iterative
approach, TRPO has been able to successively improve performance of the T/R
module and then validate the feasibility of decreasing average unit production
price by almost 50%. While these efforts do not follow a traditional CAIV model,
they have adhered to the spirit of CAIV. This adherence has allowed TRPO to
constrain the study so as to pursue a low risk solution in terms of affect on the
program's overall cost, schedule, and performance. Moreover, TRPO used the
incentive of dual-use technology to motivate Raytheon to pursue cost reductions.
B. CONCLUSIONS
In applying the tenets of CAIV, TRPO was able to define an aggressive, but
achievable cost objective for a major cost driver of the radar. Attainment of this
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cost objective will save money in prototype and production radars, as well as in the
procurement of spares over the life of the system.
Traditionally, CAIV seeks to trade requirements for performance and
schedule in order to maintain cost. In this case, performance and schedule have
been maintained while cost has been reduced. Such opportunities must be sought
whenever embarking on a CAIV initiative. The program does not always have to
trade performance or schedule. Seek areas where performance and schedule can
be held constant and cost reduced.
One of the CAIV tenets stresses management of risk. The ground rules
contained in the SOW for the study follow this tenet. The rules within which the
BoB study was accomplished attempted to constrain the study so that a low risk
solution would be found. As evidenced by the risk assessment in Chapter IV, the
recommended solution is mostly low risk with a few exceptions which can be
handled through risk handling techniques.
In analyzing the motivation of both and industry managers in this case, it
was discovered that more could be done to motivate managers to take risk in
seeking cost savings. In this case, CAIV efforts were motivated by external
pressures in the form of budgetary constraints. Additionally, it was found that
methods other than those suggested by the CAIV Working Group can be used to
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motivate industry. In this case, the commercial application of the technology was
useful in causing Raytheon to seek improvements in the cost of the T/R module.
DOD investment in the performance enhancements and cost reductions of
the THAAD radar T/R module are in congruence with Raytheon's financial and
market strategies. This has motivated Raytheon to participate in the BoB study.
C. LESSONS LEARNED
Analysis of this cost saving initiative reveals some lessons which may be
applicable to other programs.
1 . Benefit of Mergers
Recent mergers within the defense industry have given acquisition officials
cause for thought on the effects of these mergers on competition. As mergers
occur, there are fewer firms to compete for business. Competition tends to drive
cost down. With a lack of competition costs may not be driven down. There may
be, however, an opportunity to benefit from these recent mergers. As mergers pool
a large amount of expertise under one company, defense programs may be able to
direct the exploration of cost reduction efforts by the now larger company.
Technical approaches of previously not selected contractors may now be investi-
gated if that contractor has been acquired by the program's prime contractor.
2. CAIV Does Not Always Mean Trading Performance
As demonstrated by the THAAD Radar Product Office, cost reductions can
be achieved without trading off performance, while still following the tenets of
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CAIV. TRPO approached its challenges iteratively. First they addressed the
problems of achieving the EMD performance by investing in PHEMT technology.
Once this was proven to be a viable option, they addressed affordability issues.
Affordability issues were investigated in the BoB study prior to commitment of
any resources.
3. Up-Front Investment
Cost reduction efforts may require up front investment of a considerable
amount of resources. In this case, the investment is approximately $24 million
over a period of three years. This investment early in the development cycle is
needed so that cost saving technology and processes can be developed and
perfected prior to production. While short-term budget constraints may make large
up-front investments unattractive, the long-term implications must be kept in mind.
In this case the early investment of $24 million will result in the savings of $78.9
million in current year dollars. Managers must remember that they are charged
with managing for total ownership costs. Additionally, analysis reveals a 34%
IRR.
4. Dual-Use Technology as a Motivator
Use of commercial products is an idea that is encouraged in today's reform
environment. Another aspect of this idea is the commercialization of military
products. Military products with a civilian application serve to motivate
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contractors to seek product innovation and reduce production costs. In doing so,
they satisfy the firm's marketing and financial goals while at the same time
benefiting acquisition of the product.
5. Program Manager Incentives
With only regulatory and budgetary pressures incentivizing managers, the
acquisition system is doing little to incentivize managers. More needs to be done
to encourage managers to seek significant cost savings. One way to accomplish
this may be through a sharing of future savings between the program office, the
Program Executive Office, and DOD. For example, leave funding at a level to
procure EMD radars with the PHEMT technology. This will provide program
stability should efforts be delayed or fail in the development of the LCM. Once
the LCM is developed and being produced, begin to return a greater portion of the
realized savings to the Program Executive Office and DOD. Leave a small amount
of realized savings at the Program Office in order to pursue other cost saving
efforts or to further incentivize the contractor.
6. Need for Technology Expert
Due to the high technology nature of many of the current DOD acquisitions
and the swiftly advancing state of many technologies, an expert in the relevant
technology is necessary for the program office. In the case of the TRPO, an expert
from Mitre has been contracted to support efforts on the radar development. This
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expert was able to bring to the BoB study areas where gains in efficiency might be
achieved in order to reduce cost.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Incentives For Program Managers To Seek Cost Reductions
Conduct of a study to determine if sufficient incentives exist in the current
acquisition environment for Program Managers to take risk in seeking aggressive
cost savings.
2. Positioning ofDOD Management Reserve
Recently, a management reserve has been created at the DOD level. [Ref.
37] This reserve is intended to help programs that are in trouble. In the
researching for this thesis, the issue was raised whether this management reserve
was positioned at the correct level to do the most good. It was felt that smaller,
lower category programs did not have a chance of obtaining any of this reserve if it
stayed at the DOD level. Conduct a study to determine the availability of these
reserve funds to lower catagory programs.
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1 . Contractor will experience difficulty in meeting
EMD performance requirements.
2. Contractor is relying on immature, unproven
technology.
3. Contractor has limited experience in type of
development.
4. Implementation of recommendations requires state-
of-the-art advances.
5. Failure of T/REA to integrate into existing antenna
equipment architecture.
6. Processes, technology, material too complex.
7. Contractor will not be able to integrate MMICs.
8. Contractor is relying on immature manufacturing
processes.
9. Contractor will not be able to improve yield of
MMICs
10. Contractor will not be able to reduce module size.
1 1 . Contractor is relying on outside state-of-the-art
advances.
12. Performance requirements are poorly defined and
not understood by contractor
13. Performance requirements are unstable
14. Contractor has insufficient time to test thoroughly
15. Contractor has inadequate quality control program
Programmatic
1 . Contractor has inadequate plans for managing
suppliers
2. Contractor experiences loss of key personnel in
technical and management positions for the design,
engineering, and manufacturing of LCM.
3. Contractor will experience labor problems during
development ofLCM
4. Contractor is unstable financially
5. Contractor lacks capacity to produce at desired rate
6. Delays in making decisions
7. Program Office lacks funding for LCM
development
8. Contractor has inadequate plans for long lead items
and vendor support
1 The format for this matrix was extracted from Hitz, Stephen E., Risk Assessment and Analysis of the
Ml 09 Family of Vehicles Fleet Management Pilot Program , Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,







1 . Contractor ability to generate accurate cost
estimates is suspect
2. Contractor has inaccurate historical cost database on
which to base estimates of re-used processes,
technologies, etc.
3. Contractor has poor cost models on which to base
estimates ofnew processes, materials, etc.
Schedule
1 . Schedule does not reflect realistic acquisition
planning
2. Schedule not realistic and attainable
3. Contractor lacks resources to meet schedule
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